



ON  THE  ROLE  OF  WAGES  IN  THE  UKRAINIAN  TRANSITION 
PROCESS : AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 







There are two intriguing questions about the transition process undertaken by the 
Ukraine since its declaration of sovereignty in December 1991. (i) Why had one of 
the  more  prosperous  republics  of  the  former  USSR  in  terms  of  economic 
development and population welfare been suffering of both a persistent and high 
inflation during the four first years of its young existence ? (ii) How - in the early 
months of 1996 - could the Ukrainian efficiently put an end to the skyrocketing of 
prices ?  
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  understand  how  such  an  outstanding  reversal  of 
situation  could  occur.  Firstly,  in  support  of  a  cointegration  test,  we  assert  that 
between January 1992 and November 1995, the Ukraine was faced with a complex 
monetary regime in which wage was the economic variable through which most of 
the inflationary pressures passed, directly or indirectly. Secondly, we explain that 
since the beginning of 1996, the existent monetary regime has been replaced by a 
new one in which inflation is contained but wages and pensions arrears increase 
















                                                            




Since  the  breakdown  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  December  1991,  the  fifteen 
constituent  republics  have  begun  to  implement  market-oriented  reform  programs. 
The Ukraine, a big country of 52 million people and endowed of a highly developed 
industrial  sector  had  been  suffering  during  four  years  from  a  very  high  monthly 
inflation  rate.  In  fact,  the  Ukraine  had  the  worst  inflation  record  of  any  newly 
independent  state 
1.  Contrary  to all expectations, from the beginning of the year 
1996,  the  Ukrainian  government  succeeded  in  containing  the  high  inflationary 
pressures. At the present time, the Ukrainian currency, namely the Hryvnya, is as 
stable as most of currencies managed by OECD countries.  
The main goal of this paper is to reply to the following question: Is this new 
situation  of  monetary  stability  enjoyed  by  the  Ukraine  can  last  in  the  short/long 
term ?  In  the  aim  of  answering  to  such  a  question  we  adopt  and  evolve  an 
institutional lecture of the high inflationary pressures which threatened and delayed 
the success of the market oriented reform program elaborated jointly by the IMF and 
the  Ukrainian  government  since  the  starting  of  the  transition  process.  The 
institutional  feature  of  this  approach  lies  in  the  complexity  emerging  of  any 
economic system faced with galloping inflation. The dynamic structures of an high 
inflationary economy evolve to a complexity beyond human cognitive capabilities. 
For instance, for any Ukrainian private and public agents, it was in 1993 completely 
impossible  to  forecast  with  a  relative  good  degree  of  accuracy  the  forthcoming 
monthly  consumer  price  index.  The  inflation  was  admittedly  high  but  above  all 
extremely unstable
2. In such a chaotic situation Ukrainian economic agents had to 
find  simplifying  strategies  that  did  not  oblige  them  to  be  faced  with  the  full 
complexity  of  the  system.  It  is  possible  to  focus  on  these  simplifying  strategies 
adopted  by  individuals  in  this  country  during  the  high  inflationary  period  and 
conceive them as institutional arrangements intended to avoid the complexity of the 
environment. The combination of these institutional arrangements shapes a monetary 
regime in which the co-ordination of the economic activities takes place. The study 
of the mains co-ordination mechanisms is therefore a prerequisite for detecting the 
current monetary regime. Such a lecture taking into account, the structure of this 
paper  falls  into  two  parts.  Part  one  shed light on the high inflationary monetary 
regime occurred in the Ukraine for nearly four Years. This approach - supported by a 
statistical test -permits to define the main aspects of the high inflation in this country. 




                                                            
1 See Havrylyshyn, Miller and Perraudin 1994. 
2  For instance, the Ukrainian consumer price index (CPI) in summer 1994 : 79% in June, 
21% in July, 22% in August, 80% in September.  
 
1. On the process of inflation (1992-1996) 
 
From 1992 to 1996, the Ukrainian economy faced with a dramatic depreciation 
of its currency - at this time the “Karbovanets”
3. Such an high inflation provoked 
numerous  disruptions  in  the  co-ordination  of  the  economic  activities.  Many 
privatisation  projects  failed  and  various  investment  decisions  were  postponed. 
Concerning the Ukrainian case, the high inflationary period cannot be understood 
apart from a study of the co-ordination of economic activities. The idea that inflation 
operates a structural change in the coordination of economic activities is quite old. In 
this respect, David Ricardo mentioned that inflation provokes «a violent and unjust 
transfer of property». In the Ukraine, the change in income distribution was one of 
the main result and drawback of inflation. As we will explain below, several social 
classes (for example, managers of public firms) took benefit of the fast depreciation 
of the Karbovanets while others (public employees or retired persons) endured a 
drastic  reduction  of  their  revenues.  As  a  general  rule,  the  observation  of  high 
inflation episodes experienced by most of the formally planned economies of Eastern 
Europe teaches us that inflation is a complex diffusion process that modifies the 
coordination of economic activities.  
 
 
1. 1. Facts and explanations 
 
From  the  early  months  on  1992,  three  main  aspects  characterised  the 
coordination  of  the  activities  in  the  Ukraine  namely,  (a)  the  inheritance  of  the 
markets  structures,  (b)  the  attractiveness  of  the  US  Dollar  and  (c)  the  pressures 
proceeding from the International Monetary Fund. These three characteristics shaped 
a complex monetary regime driven by the requirement of wages financing. 
 
Between 1992 and 1996, the market structure (a) in the Ukraine did not change a 
lot compared with the socialist times. In such a context, the economic links between 
firms established in the former era were persisting. Even nowadays more than 50 % 
of  the  Ukrainian  industrial  sector  is  still  directly  on  indirectly  state-owned. 
Moreover, sectors remaining under state control are the most vital for the economy 
(energy,  metallurgy,  mining,  transport).  Therefore,  the  market  structure  was 
extremely vertically integrated and consequently highly monopolistic. The second 
characteristic concerns the attractiveness of the US Dollar (b). At extremely high 
rates  of  inflation,  several  markets  are  “Dollarized”.  For  specific  markets  (for 
example real estate), economic agents must be in the position to fix a price which 
can be maintained during some length of time. Some markets have to be transacted 
in a stable currency. But, from David Hume works, it can be taken for granted that 
                                                            
3 The inflation was so high that a good quoting 100 Karbovanets in January 1992 was priced 
at 641 420 Karbovanets in January 1996.  
 
the  only  way  to  import  a  foreign  currency  is  to  export  some  national  goods  or 
services. All the economic agents are seeking the Dollar. Among these agents, it is 
very  interesting  to  have  a  look  at  the  attitude  of  the  managers  of  the  public 
enterprises. The managers do not have strong incentives to cover their costs and 
especially to pay the wages of their employees
4. For a large number of them, the 
main  purpose  lies  in  accumulating  US  Dollars.  Insuring  the  profitability  of  their 
enterprise in the aim of paying the wages is secondary. As a part of the public sector, 
the managers know that the government is eventually forced to pay the wages by 
granting  some  new  credit  lines  and  consequently  issuing  fresh  money.  On  the 
contrary, the manager of a state-owned enterprise is tempted to export his production 
and, to reach this goal, he is ready to sell his goods or services at a loss. With the 
dollar, the manager can pay both himself and influent politicians to be quiet and 
continue his own business. Thus, a large number of public firms are in a situation of 
perpetual deficit and to avoid a socially unacceptable situation, the government must 
finance the wages. 
 
The Ukrainian government was incapable of stopping the financing of the unpaid 
wages by issuing fresh money. At first sight, such an economic policy could have 
been  a  real  solution  to  win  the  war  against  high  inflation.  Unfortunately,  the 
Ukrainian  government  was  “caught  like  a  rat  in  a  trap”.  Stopping  brutally  the 
monetization of deficits would have provoked automatically the failure of numerous 
firms  and  consequently  would  have  increased  the  unemployment rate. Moreover, 
such an economic policy was inapplicable regarding the market structure at work in 
the Ukrainian economy. As we noticed above (a), the economic interdependencies 
between firms of the same sector which had been established in the former socialist 
period were - and still are for a large part - at work. In such a context, the production 
of  one  entire  sector  could  have  been  paralysed  by  the  failure  of  one  firm  and 
especially if this firm was located upstream of the production process. Therefore, an 
economic policy of that kind would have provoked not only the bankruptcy of the 
insolvent enterprises but also the failure of the solvent ones.  
 
Lastly, the third characteristic shaping the Ukrainian monetary regime between 
1992 and 1996 lies in the pressures proceeding from the international organisation 
and  especially  from  the  IMF  (c).  To  receive  the  help  of  the  IMF,  the  monetary 
authorities of Ukraine have to show that they fight vigorously against high inflation. 
To  bring  the  IMF  to  the  notice  of  its  determination,  the  government  of  this 
country sometimes provokes a temporarily fall of the inflation rates.  
                                                            
4  Officially,  the  enterprise  law  states  that  wages  are  set  by  joint  worker-management 
commissions.  The  government,  in  consultation  with  trade  unions,  sets  wages  in  each 
industrial sector. Wages in the state sector are controlled.  
 
The economic mechanism at work is elementary, the government just decides to 
postpone the payment of wages for a couple of months. If there is no money, there is 
no inflation. Obviously, a such economic policy is not sustainable in the long term. 
 
The  Ukrainian  economic  authorities  adopted,  in  a  certain  way,  a  rational 
behaviour. The range of it’s alternative choices was very small considering the three 
major characteristics discussed previously. Moreover, in such a chaotic economic 
situation and beyond the major characteristics, several other parameters had to be 
taken into account by the government. For instance, the seed and harvest period 
constituted one of these additional parameters. The weight of agriculture was - and 
still is - great and this sector contributed up to 28,7% of the Ukrainian GNP in 1993. 
In January (seed period) and during the end of summer (crop period), the wages of 
the  employees  in  public  farms  had  to  be  paid.  In  these  periods  the  government 
cannot postpone this payment. 
 
Among the three characteristics listed above, during this period, wage was the 
economic variable through which most of the imbalances of the Ukrainian economy 
passed, directly or indirectly. As Heymann and Leijonhufvud (1995) pointed out that 
“Yet the channels which transform monetary impulses in price changes are neither 
simple nor direct”. Many features of the Ukrainian inflationary process have to be 
taken into account but we assert that the payment of wages was from 1992 to 1996 
the stumbling block of the complex Ukrainian monetary regime. The aim of the two 
following cointegrating analyses is to support such an assertion.  
  
 
1.2. Empirical evidence 
 
According to the descriptive evidence presented above, it is not surprising to 
notice that during 47 months - from January 1992 to November 1995 - both inflation 
and  wages  rates  were  highly  correlated  (see  graph  1).  Such  a  correlation  is 
graphically observable, but to check the veracity of our definition of the Ukrainian 
monetary regime, we must set-up the econometric tests.  
By  observing  the  following  graph,  we  can  notice  that  numerous  shocks 
characterised the recent Ukrainian high inflationary process. The main shocks which 
worsened  significantly  inflationary  pressures  are  the  following :  the  exit  of  the 
Ukraine from the ruble zone in November 1992, the rising of energy costs in April 
1993, the sudden wave of retail prices liberalisation from May to July 1993 and the 
radical program of macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reform implemented 
in October 1994
5. Obviously these shocks modified the inflation trend. Nevertheless, 
                                                            
5 In the closing months of 1994, most price controls were removed at once, except on some 
foodstuffs  and  communal  services.  Interest  rates  were  raised,  and  banking  system  credit 
strictly curtailed.  
 
they did not affect the tight relation we focus on, namely the relation between the 
payment of wages and the prices.  
 
Graph 1 : Evolution of Inflation and Wages  
                        = D Wages (in percent per month) 

























































































Monthly data used correspond to non-seasonally adjusted form and are drawn 
from  two  different  sources,  namely :  IMF  and  Ukrainian  Economic  Trends
6. 
Variables used concern the evolution in percent per month of both the logarithm of 
consumer  price  index  (CPI)  and  the  logarithm  of  average  nominal  wage  (W) 
(January  1992  =    100).
    The  CPI  is  a  Laspeyres  index  based  on  household 
consumption  shares  of  the  previous  year.  The  services  in  this  basket  include 
consumer services like housing rents and transport fares.  
The prices which are used to build this index include taxes. The average nominal 
wage is the total of the accounted wage fund (for the whole economy or for a sector) 
divided by the number of registered wage earners. In such a vertically integrated 
                                                            
6 IMF World Economic Outlook, May 1994, Chapter 5; IMF Staff Country Report No. 96/21 
“Ukraine - Recent Economic Developments”; Ukrainian Economic Trends, Monthly Update 
and Quarterly supplement. 
  
 
market  structure  (a)  in  which  the  most  important  industries  are  state-owned,  the 
entire private and public wages - and not only public - were concerned. 
Our starting point is the two steps procedure proposed by Engle and Granger 
(1987) which is specially well-suited to break down the dynamics of non-stationary 
series. 
In fact, a formal unit root test does not reject the unit root restriction for CPI and 
W, whether in the series with or without trend (also if the trend results significantly 
in both): 
  
CPI  DF(46,1)  ADF(1)  ADF(2)  ADF(3) 
































W  DF(46,1)  ADF(1)  ADF(2)  ADF(3) 
































Even, the second unit root test for CPI and W (with trend) confirm that W and 
CPI ~ I(1):  
 
CPI: DF = - 3.897 (P-value of 0.019) ; 
W: DF = - 6,797 (P-value of 0.000) ; 
 
It  is  conditional  on  the  fact  that  each  component  series  is  I(1),  therefore  we 
regress CPI on a constant and W (and the contrary) to obtain the cointegrating vector 
(standard errors are given in parentheses)
7 :  
 
CPIt = - 0.149    +   1.023 Wt                               R² = 0.997 
                                                            
7 Given that Engle and Granger statistic is affected by choice of left hand variable, we put W 
on the left hand of this regression (as suggested by J.G.MacKinnon, 1990), the corresponding 
value of the statistic is identical.  
 
             [0.076]       [0.780] 
t-stat     - 1,968         131,213 
 
So, the elasticity of CPI to W in long term is unitary. This result is moreover 
validated on the real wages that are stationary. 
Testing  for  stationarity  of  residuals  of  this  cointegrating  regression  by 
Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson and Dickey-Fuller statistics indicate signs 
of  cointegration  among  the  variables  and  no  signs  of  misspecification




CRDW = 1.027 
DF = - 3.916 [with a P-value of 0.017] 
 
To close the model, we need to specify the dynamic general form with an error 
correction mechanism (ECM): 
 
D CPI = c + D W + D Wt-1 + D Wt-2 + D CPIt-1 + D CPIt-2 + ECMt-1 
 
Eliminating non significant variables, we obtain the final specification
10: 
 
D D D D CPIt  coeff.  t-stat.  P-value 
D Wt  0.611  9.572  0.000 
D Wt-1  0.209  3.003  0.005 
D CPIt-2  0.283  3.344  0.002 
ECMt-1  - 0.318  - 3.054  0.004 
  
The result is therefore, that inflation can not be explained only from the variation 
on the current wages and the preceding one and also from the same variation in 
consumer index price of the past, but also the imbalance between levels of inflation 
and previous wages. 
In fact, the coefficient - 0.318 explains the velocity with which in a short period, 
CPI and W adjusts themselves to the preceding imbalance (ECMt-1).  
                                                            
8  We  tested  for  subsample  stability  by  estimating  the  model  before  and  after  10.1994. 
Although  there  were  some  signs  of  lack  of  stability  due  to  the  vast  program  of  price 
liberalisation  in  October  1994,  Chow’s  test  could  not  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the 
coefficients of the cointegrating vector were identical in the two simples. The other diagnostic 
tests do not give us prejudicial results to carrying out the analysis. 
9 Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity does not reject the hypothesis that : WRt = Wt - CPIt ~ 
I(0) : DF = - 3.583 (P-value 0.0418). 
10 D Wt-2 = 0.070 (t-test 0.665, P-value 0.510) and D CPIt-1 = 0.032 (t-test 0.200, P-value 
0.842).  
 
Alternatively, the test of cointegration suggested by P.Boswijk (1991) for the 
direct estimate of the system of error correction confirms the results of Engle and 
Granger Test. 
 
D CPI = D W + D Wt-1 + D Wt-2 + D CPIt-1 + D CPIt-2 + CPIt-1 + Wt-1 
 
CW (Corrected Wald) = 6.44 > 4.73  
(xt statistic for constant = trend = 0 at 20 % and k =1) 
 
Eliminating non significant variables, we obtain
11 : 
 
D D D D CPIt  coeff.  t-stat.  P-value 
D Wt  0.577  9.909  0.000 
D Wt-1  0.208  2.981  0.005 
D CPIt-2  0.246  3.148  0.003 
CPIt-1  - 0.703  - 2.820  0.007 
Wt-1  0.271  2.805  0.008 
 
Following  this  approach,  1.15  and  -  0.385  are  respectively  the  long  term 
coefficient of wages and the adjustment of variables in the short period. 
 
The  two  preceding  methods  furnish  coherent  estimates  with  the  economic 
interpretation previously given. In any case, in the end to overcome the problem of 
the superconsistence of the estimator OLS of the cointegrating vector in samples of 
small  dimension  [Stock,  1987]  alternatively  we  could  utilise  as  corrective 
mechanism in the place of residual of the static regression the retard value of real 
wages (this being  a stationary variable). In this case the coefficient in the short 
period  would  be  0.242,  not  very  different  from  -  0.318  or  -  0.385  previously 
estimated.  
 
Surprisingly, from the beginning of the year 1996, the inflationary pressures have 
grown weaker and the monthly rate of inflation decreased below the level of 10 
percent per month.  
This reversal of situation apparently reveals that the high inflationary regime as 





                                                            




2. On the process of monetary stability (1996-1997) 
 
The beginning of the year 1996 can be conceived as the stopping point of the 
high inflationary process in the Ukraine. Such an improvement on the monetary field 
leaded  to  the  introduction  of  the  Hryvnya  as  Ukraine’s  national  currency  in 
September 1996. This definite improvement on the field of inflation is too recent to 
be the subject of a significant statistical test. Nevertheless, through our institutional 
lecture and it is possible to outline the main features of the new Ukrainian monetary 
regime.  The  first  feature  to  mention is that the tenuous relation linking the high 
inflationary pressures and the financing of wages is untied (see graph 2). 
 
Graph 2 : Trend of inflation and Wages from 1996 
 
                        = D Wages (in percent per month) 




































































In reality, the new Ukrainian monetary regime is as complex as the former one. 
Admittedly, it is non-inflationary anymore but, despite appearances, the financing 
requirements of wages are still at the core of the Ukrainian monetary instability. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  year  1996,  the  government  strongly  decreased  the 
financing of wages by issuing of fresh money. Such a decision was motivated both 
by the government agreement signed with the IMF and the wish to attract foreign 
investors. As a matter of fact, the high inflationary pressures discouraged foreigners 
to invest in the Ukraine. Nevertheless, neither real nor political factors were clearly 
indicating that the time of financing the unpaid wages by a seigniorage policy was 
over.  
By the end of 1995, the state sector still represented some 55 percent of fixed 
commercial assets. Moreover, a set of restrictions and high taxes on private business 
favoured the state sector and forced much private business activity into the ‘Shadow 
economy’.  Land  reform  was  constantly  putting  back.  Ill-defined  property  rights, 
complex regulations and a seemingly arbitrary system of taxation hindered economic  
 
reforms. Lastly, the gross domestic product was still downward oriented. Therefore, 
the  Ukrainian  authorities  were  in  the  beginning  of  1996  faced  with  the  same 
constraints than those existing since the starting of the Ukrainian transition process. 
Once  both  the  decisions  of  stopping  the  seigniorage  policy  and  undertaking  a 
relatively tight monetary policy taken, the government was confronted to a shortage 
of revenues. Consequently, wage arrears increased every months and are still now 
increasing (see graph 3). 
 










































































Such an augmentation of wage arrears impoverishes significantly private agents 
which are obliged to find extra-job to maintain their standard of living. Moreover, 
the phenomenon of increase of wage arrears reduce tax revenues. But, if the tax 
system  is  not  enough  efficient  to  finance  the  budget  expenditures  then  such  a 
situation cannot last long. Unfortunately, from the end of the year 1996, the ability of 
the  tax  system  to  raise  revenues  and  target  income  generating  activities  remains 
under  question.  Following  the  example  of  Russia  and  Bulgaria,  the  Ukraine 
developed large tax arrears (see table 1). 
 
A  decrease  of  tax  revenues  associated  with  an  augmentation  of  wage  arrears 
shape a complex monetary regime. Such a new monetary regime prevents people to 
form reasonable expectations because it is impossible for any rational agent to know 










Table 1 :Tax Arrears (in million/Hryvnyas) 
12 
 
  November 1996  December 1996  January 1997  February 1997 
VAT  596,3  535,1  561,2  916,9 
Profit taxes  395,8  410,4  314,1  264,5 
Land taxes  127,3  167,4  167,6  211,90 
Excise   39,8  30,8  34,7  35,1 
TOTAL  1349,2  1307,9  1302,9  1718,3 
 
On one side the new monetary regime is non-inflationary but on the other side it 
is  not  sustainable  if  the  tax  revenues  do  not  rise  enough  to  cover  the  public 
expenditures  and  especially  those  relative  to  the  payment  of  public  wages.  As 
mentioned previously, the share of the public sector is still very important in the 
Ukrainian  economy.  For  the  moment,  the  government  succeeds  in  keeping  the 
inflation rates surprisingly low but a renewed galloping inflation is possible. As a 
matter of fact, there is not any institutional rule preventing the government to have 
recourse to monetary issue in the aim of financing the unbearable budget deficits. 
Admittedly, the National Bank of Ukraine and the cabinet of minister work jointly to 
contain the Hryvnya inside a currency band. The limits fixed are 1.7 - 1.9 Hryvnya/ 
US Dollars. Such a corridor of stability should be legalised. The private agents know 
that the budget is chronically unbalanced and fear a new monetization of deficits. 
Consequently, fixing the exchange rate is a strong message to price setters, allowing 
private agents to co-ordinate their forecasts on a low inflation path.  
 
Obviously, fixing firmly the inflation low by managing a corridor of stability for 
the Hryvnya is not the only policy to implement. Fiscal reforms concerning both 
nationals privates agents and foreign investors should support the anchoring of the 





Empirical evidence shows that the payments of wages by issue of fresh money 
were at the core of the high inflationary period experienced by the Ukraine between 
1992 and 1996. Such a relation Prices - Wages shaped a complex monetary regime 
and maintained upwards inflationary pressures. In 1996, the Ukrainian government 
succeeded in keeping the inflation low but the cure used for the disease inflation 
provoked an important accumulation of wage arrears.  
                                                            
12 Source: Ukrainian Economic Trends, Monthly update, March 1997, p. 4.  
 
A new monetary regime as complex as the former ones appeared. In order to 
anchor downwards the inflation, both a fixation of the exchange rate of the Ukrainian 
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